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Abstract
Comparative lawyers and economists have often assumed that traditional Chinese
laws and customs reinforced the economic and political dominance of elites and,
therefore, were unusually “despotic” towards the poor. Such assumptions are highly
questionable: Quite the opposite, one of the most striking characteristics of Qing and
Republican property institutions is that they often gave significantly greater economic
protection to the poorer segments of society than comparable institutions in early modern
England. In particular, Chinese property customs afforded much stronger powers of
redemption to landowners who had pawned their land. In both societies, land-pawning
occurred far more frequently among poorer households than richer ones, but Chinese
customary law allowed debtors to indefinitely retain redemption rights over collateralized
property, whereas English debtors would generally lose the property permanently if they
failed to redeem within one year.
This article argues that the comparatively “egalitarian” tendencies of Qing and
Republican property institutions stemmed from the different ways Chinese and English
rural communities allocated social status and rank. Hierarchical “Confucian” kinship
networks dominated social and economic life in most Chinese villages. Within these
networks, an individual’s status and rank depended, in large part, on his age and
generational seniority, rather than personal wealth. This allowed many low-income
households to enjoy status and rank quite disproportionate to their wealth. In comparison,
substantial landed wealth was generally a prerequisite for high status in early modern
England, effectively excluding lower-income households from positions of sociopolitical
authority. Chinese smallholders possessed, therefore, significantly more social
bargaining power, and were more capable of negotiating desirable property institutions.
Paradoxically, the predominance of kinship hierarchies actually enhanced macro-level
political and economic equality.
Category: Comparative Legal History
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Introduction
One of the oldest and most influential assumptions about traditional Chinese law
and custom is that they endorsed unusually severe socioeconomic inequality. As one
prominent comparative lawyer surmised quite recently, Chinese law and custom
displayed, even in the early 20th Century, “a strongly hierarchical view of society; a high
value placed on harmony; . . . [and a] hierarchical structure of the society
counterbalancing egalitarian organization.”1 These institutional hierarchies purportedly
reinforced both the political and economic dominance of elites, but subjected most of the
population to oppression and economic disparity2—and therefore belonged in the same
legal family as the Indian caste system or Japanese feudalism.3 Such assumptions remain
resiliently influential in current debates over, for example, why the Chinese economy
comparatively “underdeveloped” after the Eighteenth Century,4 and why Mainland China
lacks the “rule of law.”5 The echoes of Max Weber and Karl Wittfogel, categorizing the
Chinese legal tradition as “irrational,” or simply as “oriental despotism,” are
inescapable.6
At the same time, however, historians have increasingly realized that traditional
Chinese property institutions afforded unusually high levels of economic protection to
poorer rural households.7 Their egalitarian tendencies are especially poignant when
1

Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP.
L. 5, 39 (1997). For similar sentiments, see, e.g., ZHANG JINFAN, ZHONGGUO FALÜ DE CHUANTONG YU
JINDAI ZHUANXING [THE TRADITIONS AND EARLY MODERN TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE LAW] 72 (1997);
GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 52-144 (1996); ROBERTO UNGER,
LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 93 (1976); DERK BODDE &
CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 29-38 (1967); Amir N. Licht, et al., Culture rules: The
foundations of the rule of law and other norms of governance, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 659, 660, 684 (2007);
John O. Haley, Law and Culture in China and Japan: A Framework for Analysis, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 895,
906 (2006); Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1320 (2000); Albert H.Y.
Chen, Towards a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 125, 130 (2000) (summarizing the academic consensus in mainland China that traditional
Chinese legal culture was “hierarchical and oppressive”); Teemu Ruskola, Law, Sexual Morality, and
Gender Equality in Qing and Communist China, 103 YALE L.J. 2531, 2531-37 (1994).
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E.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 112 (J. Sibree trans., 1956); THOMAS B. STEPHENS,
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: THE SHANGHAI MIXED COURT, 1911-27, at 115 (1992); KARL A.
WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957); Chen, supra note 1;
ZHANG, supra note 1.
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Mattei, supra note 1.
4
Some of the best-known examples include DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY AND POVERTY 117 (2010) (attributing Chinese
underdevelopment to the unchecked power of its ruling elite); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL
CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 124 (M. Pensky, Trans., 2001) (arguing that Asian societies must
discard their hierarchical legal institutions to achieve capitalist modernity); ERIC L. JONES, GROWTH
RECURRING: ECONOMIC CHANGE IN WORLD HISTORY 130-46 (1988); and WITTFOGEL, supra note 2.
5
E.g., Licht et al., supra note 1; Haley, supra note 1, at 915.
6
See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1063 (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich eds., 1968); MAX
WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 232-44 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954). For criticism, see Robert
M. Marsh, Weber’s Misunderstanding of Chinese Law, 106 AM. J. SOCIOL. 281 (2000). On oriental
despotism, see WITTFOGEL, supra note 1.
7
E.g., Robert Brenner & Christopher Isett, England’s Divergence from China’s Yangtze Delta: Property
Relations, Microeconomics, and Patterns of Development, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 609 (2002); Robert C.
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compared with early modern Western, particularly English, property institutions. One
especially compelling example is the redemption of collateralized property, a vital
concern for lower-income households that relied on land-pawning instruments—“dian”
sales (“conditional sales”) in Qing and Republican China8 and mortgages in early modern
England—for monetary liquidity.9 Despite vigorous opposition by the wealthiest
segments of society, customary law in most of China granted “dian” sellers—in other
words, “land pawnors”—an essentially unlimited right of redemption, viable for decades
after the initial sale.10 In comparison, early modern English institutions generally
allowed creditors to permanently seize mortgaged land if the debtor failed to repay within
a year, thereby encouraging the aggressive consolidation of land into large private
estates.11
Can these two themes, one of prevalent sociolegal hierarchy and one of strongly
egalitarian property institutions, coexist in our understanding of the Chinese legal
tradition? One possible solution is to portray both as symptoms of a backward,
“premodern” society. Several historians have, indeed, attributed the peculiarly strong
protection of land redemption rights in Chinese property customs to certain cultural, even
semi-religious, characteristics that directly encouraged such protection: Chinese rural
communities adhered, they claim, to “precommerical” moral ideals of “permanence in
landholding,” partially due to the lack of market integration, labor mobility, and
economic specialization.12 This largely concurs with the Wittfogelian perception of
China as an immobile, underdeveloped society locked into rigid hierarchies.
The problem, however, is that pre-industrial China was far from “precommercial.”
Recent scholarship demonstrates that Chinese households, wealthy and poor alike, were
economically rational and ruthlessly self-interested.13 In addition, the economy was
significantly market-based, while land ownership was increasingly commoditized and
impersonal.14 There is, in fact, no real evidence that people agreed on “precommercial”
ideals of “permanence in landholding.” Quite the opposite, this article presents
considerable evidence that property norms, particularly “dian” redemption norms, were
generally the product of fiercely self-interested negotiation: Higher-income households
tended to resist generous “dian” redemption norms, whereas smallholders were almost
Ellickson, The Cost of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China (Yale Law & Econ. Research
Paper no.441, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1953207; Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of PreIndustrial China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129 (2011).
8
Qing rule over China ran from 1644 to 1912. The Republican era ran from 1912 to 1949.
9
PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC
COMPARED 71-98 (2001); Zhang, supra note 7, at 156-74.
10
Zhang, supra note 7, at 156-74.
11
Id. at 175-86; 18 PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 143-46 (1904).
12
HUANG, supra note 9, at 74; MELISSA MACAULEY, SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL CULTURE: LITIGATION
MASTERS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 234 (1998).
13
See Lynda S. Bell, Farming, Sericulture, and Peasant Rationality in Wuxi County in the Early Twentieth
Century, in CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 207, 226-29, 232-39 (Thomas G. Rawski &
Lillian M. Li eds., 1992).
14
On markets and commercialization, see, e.g., LI BOZHONG, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGNAN,
1620-1850, at 107-08 (1998); and KENNETH POMERANZ, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: CHINA, EUROPE, AND
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY 86-87 (2000). On the commoditization of land, see
THOMAS BUOYE, MANSLAUGHTER, MARKETS AND MORAL ECONOMY: VIOLENT DISPUTES OVER PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CHINA 94 (2000).
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uniformly in favor. A broadly similar situation existed in early modern England, where
both large landholders and smallholders pushed for property norms that advanced their
economic interests. The difference, however, is that Chinese smallholders were
significantly more successful in obtaining favorable institutions than their English
counterparts.
But why? If we simply believe—as many scholars continue to do—that Chinese
sociolegal hierarchies bred unusually severe class-based political and economic
oppression and “oriental despotism,” then why were Chinese smallholders comparatively
successful in the negotiation of key property institutions? As noted above, large
landholders rarely conceded these institutions willingly, but were simply unable to
overturn them. In what sense, then, was the Chinese legal tradition truly hierarchical?
This article argues that Chinese property institutions were comparatively
egalitarian precisely because Chinese law and society was deeply “hierarchical.” This
requires, however, that we reject any variation of the old “oriental despotism” thesis in
favor of a more nuanced understanding of Chinese sociolegal hierarchies. In other words,
the Chinese legal tradition was indeed “hierarchical,” but not in the sense that it helped a
wealthy political elite dominate and oppress the poorer masses. Although late imperial
laws did indeed endorse certain status inequalities between state officials and commoners,
they were of limited macro-level significance: Officials were few in number, and wielded
little influence in local affairs. Correspondingly, some historians have come to realize
that the most important hierarchies in Chinese law and society—those that truly affected
every level of socioeconomic life—were instead between senior and junior relatives:
between parents and children, uncles and nephews, elder brothers and younger brothers.15
The sociopolitical dominance of senior relatives over junior ones was not merely
enshrined in formal and customary law, but was probably internalized as a foundational
moral principle by most of the Qing and Republican population.
But what even these scholars have missed is that these “Confucian” kinship
hierarchies enhanced, rather than undermined, political equality between rich and poor.
Their predominance in rural society—compared to the relative “individualism” of early
modern English society—was, in fact, the very reason Chinese property norms protected
lower-income households more rigorously than corresponding English institutions.
The following pages will demonstrate that the social status and rank of most
individuals in Qing and Republican China depended significantly on their generational
seniority within their respective patrilineal descent groups. In contrast, the importance of
kinship and communal ties in rural English society precipitously declined in late
Medieval and early modern times.16 The tighter social fabric of rural China was
indisputably more “hierarchical”—elder kinsmen wielded extensive legal and customary
authority over younger ones—but also conferred large status benefits on lower-income
households: Because status was so closely tied to age and generational seniority, the
system guaranteed significant status mobility within most individual lifetimes. People
automatically gained status as they aged, theoretically independent of personal wealth.
15

See discussion at infra, pp. _-_.
ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: FAMILY, PROPERTY, AND SOCIAL
TRANSITION (1978); David Cressy, Kinship and Kin Interaction in Early Modern England, 113 PAST &
PRESENT 38, 41 (1986); H.R. French & Richard Hoyle, English Individualism Refuted and Reasserted: the
Case of Earls Colne (Essex), 1550-1750, 56 ECON. HIST. REV. 595 (2003).
16
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In practice, of course, wealth remained a valuable social asset, but even so, lowerincome seniors could frequently obtain status and authority quite disproportionate to their
wealth. Even this weaker claim is significant in a comparative context: By most accounts,
significant landholding was a strict prerequisite for higher status in rural England, leading
to the near-monopolization of sociopolitical authority by the wealthy.17 The cumulative
social status and authority of smallholders and tenants was, therefore, much higher in
China than in England.
Higher status naturally led to stronger bargaining positions in the negotiation of
property norms. In both early modern China and England, property norms were more
often shaped by local custom rather than formal law. In other words, they were generally
negotiated within local communities. Differences between Chinese and English property
norms reflected, therefore, the different local power balances at play in such negotiations:
Because Chinese smallholders and tenants cumulatively possessed higher social status
than their English peers, Chinese property norms protected their immediate economic
interests far more vigorously than English norms.
This thesis does not postulate the existence of some “Confucian welfare state”18 in
China. The imperial Chinese state did support some social welfare programs—notably
disaster relief granaries19—but embraced no sweeping ideology of socioeconomic
equality. There is similarly no evidence, as discussed above, to suggest that local
economic elites were substantively more sympathetic towards their poorer countrymen or
townsmen than English ones. The primary difference was not one of generosity or
attitude, but simply that Chinese economic elites were less able to impose their will on
poorer households.20
The redemption of pawned land was hardly the only area where Chinese property
norms were more egalitarian than English ones. For example, Qing and Republican local
customs also favored poorer households over richer ones in crucial aspects of tenancy
regulation. Most notably, Lower Yangtze customs regularly allowed and protected the
right of “permanent tenancy” (“yong dian”), in which landlords lost the right to raise
rents or evict tenants.21 Early modern English landlords suffered no comparable
handicaps and were notoriously ruthless in the eviction of tenants and consolidation of
estates.22 The model of custom formation presented here may explain, therefore, several
key differences between Chinese and English property institutions, although the article
can examine only one in detail.
While the primary goal of this article is to explain a major historical phenomenon
and revise our understanding of traditional Chinese sociolegal hierarchies, it also
17

KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1580-1680, at 43 (2003); H.R. French, Social Status, Localism
and the ‘Middle Sort of People’ in England, 1620-1750, 166 PAST & PRESENT 66 (2000).
18
On state welfarism in Chinese history, see R. BIN WONG, CHINA TRANSFORMED: HISTORICAL CHANGE
AND THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE (1997).
19
See, e.g., LILLIAN M. LI, FIGHTING FAMINE IN NORTH CHINA (2007).
20
See discussion at infra, pp. _-_.
21
E.g., HUANG, supra note 9, at 99-118; KATHRYN BERNHARDT, RENTS, TAXES, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE:
THE LOWER YANGTZE REGION, 1840-1950, at 21-27 (1992).
22
See THE BRENNER DEBATE 10-67 (T.H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin eds., 1987); R.W. Hoyle, Tenure and
the Land Market in Early Modern England: Or a Late Contribution to the Brenner Debate, 43 ECON. HIST.
REV. 1 (1990). Although scholars involved in the “Brenner Debate” vehemently disagreed over whether
landlord aggression could explain the Seventeenth Century Anglo-French economic divergence, all agreed
that such aggression was indeed prevalent in England.
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connects to a broader theoretical literature on social norms. For decades, sociologists and
economists—particularly their respective reincarnations within the legal academy—have
debated the roles of culture and historical tradition in the creation of social norms. To
crudely summarize a long debate, the former group has generally argued that the societal
“internalization” of cultural and moral values plays a crucial role in norm creation,
whereas the latter sees norm creation as predominantly a bargaining process between
rationally self-interested individuals.23 Law and economics scholars point out, surely
correctly, that traditional sociological studies often treated cultures as consolidated
“operative engines” without carefully considering whether self-interested rationality
could explain many phenomena they considered ideological or “cultural.”24 On the other
hand, many have criticized rational choice-based theories for failing to satisfactorily
reflect the complexity of social reality.25
A more recent strand of scholarship, sometimes termed “law and socioeconomics,”
attempts to bridge the gap between these two approaches by simply acknowledging that
some norms are rationally negotiated while others are internalized.26 This begs the
question, however, of which norms are which, and whether there are predictable patterns
of interaction between the two categories. Some have hypothesized the existence of
“pyramids of norms,” in which higher tier norms, potentially created via internalization
of core religious or cultural values, set the parameters within which lower tier norms are
rationally negotiated.27 A supporting contention is that certain kinds of norms,
particularly those governing basic social interactions such as kinship and core religious
affinity, are more prone to internalization than explicitly economic norms such as
23

Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 537, 542
(1998); Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion and History, 34 L. & SOC. REV. 157, 158
(2000); Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 625.
24
Ellickson, supra note 23. For a specific example, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN,
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003), which
applies a political economy methodology to the study of the Japanese judiciary. Their work has been
challenged on multiple fronts, including methodological ones. Frank Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful
Public Servants? Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 L. SOC. INQUIRY 421 (2005); JOHN OWEN
HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (2006).
25
See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1602
(2000). See also PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice trans., 1990) (developing a
theory of “habitus” that counters rational choice theories). Rational choice theories struggle, in particular,
to explain how rational individuals desist from free-riding on norm enforcement and adherence. Although
certain evolutionary game theory models claim to explain social cooperation under fixed conditions, e.g.,
Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, The Evolution of Norms, 106 AM. J. SOCIOL. 1493 (2001), those
conditions often seem unrealistic: for example, that players interact one-on-one even in an n-person game
and possess perfect information. Id. at 1533-34. Some have attempted to bypass these difficulties by
suggesting that withholding or conferring esteem is “costless.” Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICHIGAN LAW REV. 338 (1997). This, too, seems
implausible—reputational injury provokes retaliation just as readily as material injury. Suggestions that
people obey or enforce social norms to “signal” future cooperation, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS (2000), have also been criticized. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law,
Norms and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 643-54, 663-68 (2000).
26
E.g., Mark A. Edwards, Acceptable Deviance and Property Rights, 43 CONN. L. REV. 457, 464-75 (2010);
Etzioni, supra note 23, at 158; Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 UNIV.
PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007).
27
E.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-278 (1989); Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law:
Why Peoples Obey the Law, 4 REV. L & ECON. 715 (2008).
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property and contract norms.28 This is conceivably because people are usually exposed to
the former at a younger age, when personal values are still in their formative stage.29
By narrowly defining the content and scope of internalized values, and by laying
out the precise mechanisms through which they affect calculations of self-interest, the
“pyramids” thesis aspires to provide an empirically testable account of how cultural
factors shape social norms. It hopes to solve, therefore, the so-called “Sen’s Paradox,”
referring to Amartya Sen’s call for theories of socioeconomic behavior that both “bring in
something outside individual choice behavior,” but also avoid speaking of “society’s
‘preferences’” in such aggregate terms that no empirical testing is possible.30 At the
moment, however, very little empirical verification of the “pyramids” thesis exists.
The historical account presented here fills in some of that empirical void. It
demonstrates how internalized communal values shaped the negotiation of property
norms by institutionalizing the allocation of social status and authority among interested
parties. Within this rudimentary “pyramid of norms,” “Confucian” kinship hierarchies
were the “higher tier” norm that defined the parameters within which self-interested
parties negotiated “lower tier” property norms.
Geographically, it makes little sense to compare England with all of China due to
the enormous socioeconomic variance between Chinese macroregions. Instead, this
article focuses on two comparatively developed coastline regions: the Lower Yangtze and
North China.31 Temporally, it focuses on the 16th and 17th Centuries for England and the
later Qing and Republican eras for China. Most of its Chinese primary sources fall
within 1865-1940, a period of relative social stability in most rural localities, despite
turmoil on the national political stage. The goal here is to compare societies at similar
stages of economic development: both England and the two Chinese macroregions
boasted significantly commercialized economies on the cusp of industrialization;32 both
were predominantly agricultural and self-contained, but had some access to maritime
trade;33 finally, both recognized and protected private property rights through law and
custom.34 Rigorous analysis and comparison would be impossible without these broad
similarities. By the early 18th Century, overseas trade would occupy a much greater share
of the English economy, making it significantly less comparable to any Chinese
macroregion.
A final word about the use of “egalitarian” in this article: Although the term
“egalitarian” may be used to describe any kind of equality-promoting behavior or
28

Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PENN. L. REV. 1643, 1661-62 (1996); Licht, supra note 27, at 721.
29
Licht, supra note 27, at 721.
30
Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 ECONOMETRICA 495, 498 (1993).
31
On North China, see PHILIP C.C. HUANG, THE PEASANT ECONOMY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NORTH
CHINA (1985); KENNETH POMERANZ, THE MAKING OF A HINTERLAND: STATE, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY IN
INLAND NORTH CHINA, 1853-1937 (1993). On the Lower Yangtze, see LI, supra note 14.
32
See supra note 14
33
For the relative unimportance of trade to the early modern English economy, see RALPH DAVIS, THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND BRITISH OVERSEAS TRADE 63 (1979). Cf. The Rise of Europe: Atlantic
Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. R. 546 (2005), which argues that trade
was institutionally important even if statistically modest.
34
See Madeleine Zelin, A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar China, in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN
EARLY MODERN CHINA 17 (Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko & Robert Gardella eds., Stanford Univ.
Press 2004).

7

policy,35 within this article’s context, it specifically describes institutions and actions that
promote the political and economic interests of lower-income households. It is also used
in a purely descriptive sense, without ideological connotations attached.
Part One discusses common assumptions about sociolegal “hierarchy” in early
modern China. Part Two outlines some examples where Chinese property norms were
unusually protective of smallholders, drawing comparisons with corresponding English
institutions that favored the economic interests of higher-income households. Part Three
unpacks a model of social norm negotiation that explains why the existence of
“Confucian” social hierarchies actually enhanced egalitarianism in property institutions.
Part Four, the article’s empirical core, tests this model against a wide array of historical
data, including court cases, contracts, rural surveys, and lineage registries. The
Conclusion further discusses the theoretical significance of these findings.
Part One: Hierarchy and Law in Pre-Industrial China
The argument that law and custom in imperial China was “hierarchical” is as old
as the field of Chinese legal history. Insofar as scholars even acknowledged China had
“law,”36 they rarely failed to describe that “law” as, more or less, “a moral code calling
for inequality and hierarchy,”37 and therefore a tool of political control that could not lead
to genuine “rule of law.”38 For many, the study of Chinese law and custom was, and
remains, no more than the “the scholarly study of obsequious submission to authority and
hierarchy.”39 The many logical problems with that reasoning aside, the more
fundamental question is: “hierarchical” in what sense?
“Hierarchy” is an analytically useless term unless it is further specified and
elaborated: Hierarchy of whom over whom? Under what conditions? With what kinds of
privileges? Although vast numbers of scholars have made the “imperial Chinese law and
society were hierarchical” argument, few have addressed these questions with detail or
nuance. For a very long time, the dominant image of Chinese legal hierarchies was
simply some version of “oriental despotism” and class oppression: Law and local custom
alike were created by a narrow class of elites who utilized institutions at all levels—
including, but not limited to, unfair advantages in government recruiting, uneven tax
duties, and favorable property norms—to protect their core self-interests, largely to the
political and economic detriment of other classes.40 As one legal article stated, “[f]or

35

Egalitarianism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/
(last visited March 7, 2013) (“An egalitarian favors equality of some sort: People should get the same, or be
treated the same, or be treated as equals, in some respect.”).
36
This was disturbingly rare even a few years ago. See William P. Alford, Law, Law, What Law?: Why
Western Scholars of Chinese History and Society Have Not Had More to Say about Its Law, 23 MODERN
CHINA 398 (1997); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
37
Ruskola, supra note 1, at 2531.
38
See, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 46 (2002); Tom
Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 763, 767 (2002) (summarizing previous literature); Haley, supra note 1, at 915.
39
STEPHENS, supra note 2.
40
See sources cited at supra note 2; ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 4; UNGER, supra note 1
(describing Chinese sociolegal hierarchy as class-based); Patricia Ebrey & James Watson, Introduction, in
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centuries, Chinese concepts of property rights were rooted in strongly autocratic
Confucian doctrine that enshrined and vindicated hierarchy, authority and inequality.”41
For the most part, this remains the academic dogma in mainland China, where major
legal history narratives almost universally decry the “feudal” and “oppressive” nature of
imperial institutions.42
Such oppression purportedly generated severe wealth disparity, lack of social
mobility, and, ultimately, relative economic decline: elite domination stifled free
entrepreneurialism and technological innovation, created tremendous social unrest, and
left the rural economy vulnerable to natural disasters.43 Insofar as Chinese immigrants
have been economically successful in other parts of the world, their success supposedly
stems from the disintegration of traditional sociopolitical hierarchies and greater mobility
in immigrant communities.44
The image of a dominant elite ruling the country is not entirely unsubstantiated:
Legal culture, even in the Ming and Qing, certainly privileged certain social groups over
others. The emperor was largely beyond formal legal sanction, and the law afforded
special statuses, including exemption from most taxes and legal prosecution, to his
extended family.45 More generally, Manchu bannermen possessed economic privileges
not available to Han Chinese throughout the Qing,46 while high-level national
examination degree holders enjoyed significant political and social advantages over lower
level scholars or non-degree holders.47
To portray these privileges as the symptoms of class-based institutional
oppression is, however, to exaggerate the sociopolitical clout of these elites. They
occupied, first of all, a tiny portion of the population. Due to stubborn government
reluctance to expand examination degree quotas in proportion to population growth,
degree-holders of any level were extremely rare in the Qing—far lower than one percent
of total population.48 Imperial clan members were, of course, even rarer. Even
bannermen did not exceed a few percentage points of the total and, in any case, had lost
much of their privileged status by the Nineteenth Century.49 To put this in comparative
KINSHIP ORGANIZATION IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA, 1000-1940, at 1-2 (Patricia Ebrey & James Watson eds.,
Univ. of California Press, 1986).
41
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perspective, titled nobility comprised perhaps two percent of early modern England’s
population,50 to say nothing of the far more numerous landed gentry. More importantly,
the Qing state was very limited: its small size severely dampened tax collection and law
enforcement powers, forcing local officials to leave most administrative and rulemaking
duties to communal, guild or kinship based self-governance.51
Perhaps aware of these flaws in the traditional “elite despotism” thesis, scholars
have increasingly pointed to “Confucian” kinship institutions as a more comparatively
significant source of sociopolitical hierarchy52: Virtually all segments of Qing society
recognized systematic inequalities between different family members.53 Parents naturally
occupied a higher sociolegal position than their offspring, as did uncles over nephews,
and elder brothers or cousins over younger ones. Physically assaulting a parent, for
example, was punishable by death, whereas beating one’s child was perfectly acceptable.
Even disobedience or rudeness to a senior relative could constitute a punishable offense,
if not by law then by lineage self-regulation or local custom. Unsurprisingly, major
socioeconomic decisions were generally made by the household patriarch in consultation
with other senior male members of his kinship group. Relatives also enjoyed certain
economic privileges over non-relatives: Many local customs dictated, at least nominally,
that landowners offer their land to relatives first when exploring sale options, and only
sell to non-relatives if those offers are unsuccessful.54
Kinship hierarchies retained much of their vitality even after the Qing’s collapse.
Republican legal codes narrowed the range of privileges afforded to senior relatives, but
did not eliminate them altogether.55 For example, killing or assaulting a senior relative
continued to be punished more severely than usual homicide or assault.56 More
importantly, the great majority of local communities continued to recognize and enforce
traditional kinship hierarchies throughout the Republican era, and many do so even
today.57
Despite their immense historical importance, how Confucian kinship hierarchies
affected society-wide distributions of wealth and sociopolitical status is hardly
understood, if at all. Most pieces simply ignore the issue. Scholars of considerable
reputation but questionable exposure to Chinese history, most famously Jürgen Habermas,
have attempted to dismiss the compatibility of kinship institutions with economic and
50
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social “modernity” in broad, but clearly misguided, strokes: Because familial hierarchies
are supposedly incompatible with normative certainty and predictability, “Asiatic
societies cannot participate in capitalistic modernization without taking advantage of the
achievements of an individualistic legal order.”58 Others, particularly mainland Chinese
scholars, attempt to conflate kinship hierarchies with the despotism thesis, arguing that
the former encouraged habitual submission to authority that supported the latter.59
There may be some truth to that, but as this Article will demonstrate, whether in
the creation of property and contract institutions or in the local distribution of political
authority, kinship hierarchies weakened class and wealth-based oppression. In the very
limited sense that they recognized status differences between different individuals,
kinship institutions were indeed “hierarchical.” From a broader perspective, however, the
term “hierarchical” masks some fairly unique characteristics: Unlike in other social
hierarchies that tied status strictly to heritage, including most feudal or caste-based
societies, the category of privileged persons was very fluid under Confucian norms. As
one aged and had children, he or she automatically gained legal and customary authority
over younger generations. Normatively, wealth did not affect status within kinship
groups. A wealthy nephew owed the same sociolegal obligations to a penniless uncle as
a penniless nephew to a wealthy one.
However counterintuitively, these kinship hierarchies should theoretically have
promoted, rather than damaged, status mobility, simply because everyone aged, which
automatically boosted their status and rank both within and beyond their kinship network.
This latter point requires some elaboration: Most kinship networks were of considerable
size—several dozen households in North China, and considerably more than that in the
Lower Yangtze—and, therefore, carried enough collective clout that high rank within the
kinship network generally translated also into relatively high status beyond its borders.
Because kinship hierarchies were theoretically disconnected from wealth, they
should have empowered large numbers of low-income but high-seniority individuals
against their wealthier kin and, therefore, should have helped level the cumulative
sociopolitical balance between rich and poor. In crude terms, even the wealthiest
individuals probably had poorer relatives who were of similar or higher generational
seniority. It was, hypothetically, a system were systematic individual inequality led to
macro-level equality between rich and poor.
As the remainder of this Article will demonstrate, even in practice, Confucian
social hierarchies generated enough status mobility to inject much socioeconomic
egalitarianism into China’s property and contract institutions—in fact, significantly more
than what one finds in early modern English norms. Late imperial and Republican
property customs often offered superior protection to lower-income households than
comparable institutions in England. More importantly, they did so precisely because
kinship hierarchies remained strong in China, whereas English society had become
“individualistic.” This hardly meant that affluent Chinese households harbored greater
sympathy towards poorer kinsmen, but rather that kinship hierarchies facilitated
cumulative status equality amongst even the most self-interested of people.
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Part Two: The Relative Egalitarianism of Chinese Property Institutions
For such a “hierarchical” legal culture, Chinese laws and customs could often be
astonishingly “soft” towards lower income households. The full extent of this is best
appreciated—perhaps only appreciated, considering the virtual impossibility of imagining
what “wealth-neutral” property norms look like—in a comparative context. The choice
here to compare Chinese property institutions with early modern English ones draws
from both the intellectual appeal of the “Great Divergence” literature60 and, as seen
below, from the innate analytical cogency of that comparison.
This Article focuses primarily on norms that regulated, for lack of a better term,
“land pawning”—transactions that allowed a cash-needy landholder to collateralize his
holdings for a large sum, equal to most or even all of its full market value. Such
instruments were crucial to the development of mature land markets and monetary
liquidity in early modern economies, where land was the prime source of capital and
livelihood, and therefore sold with considerable reluctance. As the author has discussed
elsewhere, the primary instrument for land collateralization—in fact, the only instrument
commonly available to landholders—was the mortgage in early modern England, and the
“dian” (“conditional sale”) in Qing and Republican China.61
Compared to modern Anglo-American mortgages, the “classic mortgage” of
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England was a duller instrument. Modern mortgages
allow, of course, repayment schedules of up to several decades, generally permit the
mortgagor to maintain possession of the property, and, in cases of default, arrange
foreclosure auctions to raise the collateral’s full market value.62 The classic mortgage
was not nearly as lenient to mortgagors: First, mortgagees were allowed to possess the
land while waiting for repayment.63 More importantly, most local customs dictated that
mortgagors must repay their debts within a very short time-frame—generally six months
to a year after the initial conveyance, or the mortgagees would automatically obtain full
ownership of the collateral.64
Up until the early Eighteenth Century, Common Law courts enforced these
customary deadlines quite ruthlessly, so much that Chancery felt compelled to aid
beleaguered mortgagors by establishing “the equity of redemption,” allowing judges to
extend redemption deadlines and demand foreclosure auctions upon final default.65
These reforms did not, however, harden into established doctrine until the midEighteenth Century, and even then, their prominence over Common Law rules was
questionable.66
The cash-needy landowner in early modern China faced far more favorable
institutional conditions. Most Qing and Republican land transactions were not permanent
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sales, but rather “dian” (“conditional”) sales, where the “dian” “seller” conveyed land to
the “buyer” for 60 to 80 percent of the property’s full market value, but retained the right
to redeem at zero interest.67 The “dian” buyer’s interest in lending money under such an
arrangement was not monetary interest, but whatever profit the land could yield before
the seller redeemed. He was, therefore, often protected by contractually-established
“guaranteed usage periods” (“xian”) of one or more years, during which the seller could
not redeem.68 In addition, he could obtain full ownership of the land if the “dian” seller
agreed to convert the transaction into a permanent sale (“mai”), upon which the seller
would receive “additional payments” (“zhaotie”) that made up the difference between the
original transaction price and the land’s present market value.69
Most significantly, “dian” customs generally allowed “dian” sellers to retain
redemption rights ad infinitum. As one local custom stated, “dian” sales “could be
redeemed after several hundred years, and the price of redemption would always remain
the same.”70 Similar customs were commonplace throughout China’s core regions,
particularly North China and the Lower Yangtze.71 Many explicitly forbid the original
contract from setting any redemption deadline. Others allowed redemption rights to be
exercised “any time after the guaranteed-usage period’s expiration.” These rules were
not for show: Under their influence, very few “dian” contracts attempted to establish
redemption deadlines, and most “dian” sales were apparently redeemed at some point.72
Local legal archives contain, moreover, numerous cases where a “dian” seller or his
descendants attempted to redeem after astonishingly long periods—sometimes a century.
This was an institutional arrangement rife with social tension. During the decades
that often passed between “dian” sale and redemption request, families might move,
original contractors might die, or usage rights might be transferred to a third party. The
swelling volume of related disputes brought before local courts eventually pushed the
central government into action: It made several attempts to limit the redemption window
of “dian” sales, ordering first in the Qing Code that all contracts must explicitly indicate
whether they were permanent sales or “dian” sales,73 and then, in the 1758 Board of
Finance Regulations, that regular “dian” sales must be redeemed within ten years or be
converted to a permanent sale, with at most a one-year extension.74
Enforcement of these legal rules, however, was weak. A survey of local case
archives from the later Qing suggests that the great majority of redemption deadline
cases—where the “dian” buyer refused to allow redemption because too much time had
passed since the original contract—were eventually settled via external mediation, often
at the court’s behest.75 Due to their lack of coercive authority, local magistrates were
hesitant to formally adjudicate cases where central laws and regulations conflicted with
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local custom. This is unsurprising, as historians have long emphasized the serious
weakness of the Qing state in local governance, especially in the regulation of
commercial activity.76
By the Republican era, the government had basically admitted that Qing rules
against excessive redemption were unenforceable: early Republican-era governments
extended the national deadline for land redemption to sixty years, a clear concession to
local custom.77 After 1929, the newly-victorious Nationalist government attempted to
impose a thirty year deadline nationwide,78 but surveys of Northern Chinese peasants
conducted a decade later suggest that their efforts were ineffectual: Most peasants had no
knowledge of it, and most who did believed that no one followed it.79
For “dian” sellers, these customary norms offered tremendous advantages with
very limited downside. The most obvious evidence of this is that, in the variety of
disputes examined below, “dian” sellers universally argued in favor of these norms,
whereas “dian” buyers were almost always opposed. This is unsurprising: Land was, to
most rural residents in these early modern times, the single most valuable kind of
property, not only because of its high market value but also because it was the foundation
of most economic production. As various Qing and Republican era sources repeatedly
claim, landowners generally sold land only when financial conditions made it absolutely
necessary, and therefore usually preferred redeemable “dian” sales to permanent ones.80
Under these conditions, an institutional framework that effectively eliminated the danger
of default and seizure was highly attractive to cash-strapped landowners.
“Dian” sellers did lose some contractual freedom under this arrangement, but not
much. They could not contractually establish a deadline for redemption even if they
wanted to. Removing the possibility of default did not, however, remove the possibility
of permanent alienation: If, after the original contract, the “dian” seller ever wished to
permanently convey his land, he could simply request an additional payment (“zhaotie”),
converting the “dian” sale into a permanent one at full market value.81 A more serious
concern might be that the inability to impose redemption deadlines would be priced into
“dian” prices, which were, in fact, only 60 to 80 percent of the land’s full value. Because,
however, most “dian” sales were made under considerable financial stress, a lower “dian”
value, so long as it covered immediate needs, was a far smaller concern than obtaining
extended redemption rights. Moreover, there were ways to negotiate higher “dian” prices:
the seller could simply grant a longer guaranteed-usage period (“xian”), which gave
buyers greater security and larger returns.
On the other hand, customary law did “dian” buyers few favors. The constant
danger of redemption after the guaranteed-usage period’s expiration seriously decreased
76
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the land’s value to buyers by discouraging both long-term investments to improve the
land and use of the land as a reliable source of capital or collateral.82 The tremendous
attractiveness of “dian” customs to potential land sellers also drained the supply of
permanent land sales, further exacerbating the difficulty of secure land accumulation.83
Despite all this, the demand for “dian” sales remained high during times of relative peace,
driven by a combination of population growth, commercialization, and nascent
industrialization. All in all, “dian” selling was a strikingly low-risk affair in early modern
China, especially when compared to the perils of English mortgaging.
Not surprisingly, the economic identities of creditors and debtors were broadly
similar across the two countries: both mortgagors and “dian” sellers were generally much
poorer compared to mortgagees and “dian” buyers. The historical literature is
remarkably consistent on this: Few would dispute that the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries were, in England, a time of massive wealth and land concentration from small
tenants and lesser yeomen into the hands of large capitalist farmers.84 The process, in its
earlier stages, relied primarily on land transactions—sales and mortgages, driven on the
supply side by falling grain prices and shrinking agricultural profit margins—rather than
enclosure.85 Although China did not experience any comparable flood of land
engrossment, its overall pattern of land transaction was nonetheless from poorer
households to wealthier ones. In one fairly typical North China village, for example,
around 85% of “dian” sellers during the later 1930s possessed less land than the village
average, and nearly 40% possessed less than a third of that average. In contrast, less than
3% belonged to the top 25% of landowners.86 Additional circumstantial evidence can be
found in contract collections from late Qing and Republican era Zhejiang Province: They
commonly show one household conditionally buying multiple parcels from a wide
assortment of sellers, which certainly suggests that a few relatively wealthy households
were aggressively acquiring land from numerous poorer ones.87
The institutional protection of “dian” sellers was, therefore, also the protection of
poor against rich. Likewise, the harsh treatment of mortgagors in English custom usually
meant harsh treatment of smallholders and tenants in favor of aggressively expanding
gentry and capitalist farmers. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, the institutional
contrast between “dian” and mortgage significantly explains why landholding was more
equitable in China than in England88: “Landlords” and “large farmers” owned only 40 to
82
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50 percent of arable land throughout the later Qing and Republic, and managed less than
15 percent.89 In comparison, conventional estimates of landownership by the English
royalty, nobility and gentry range from 65 to 75 percent of total land in 1690, 85 in 1790,
and 90 by 1873.90 Moreover, “capitalist,” managerial farms dominated agricultural
production as early as 1700, largely by squeezing out smallholders and converting them
into paid labor. “Dian” redemption norms were instrumental in preventing the largescale centralization of land in China, whereas mortgage laws were similarly important in
facilitating the very same process in England.
Land redemption was not the only major area of property regulation where
Chinese local customs were significantly more accommodating towards the economically
disadvantaged. The same characterization also applies to customs and laws governing
tenant eviction and rent adjustment: Since at least the Eighteenth Century, local customs
across the Lower Yangtze and South China recognized rights of “permanent tenancy”
(“yong dian”), an endless tenancy that permitted eviction or rent-raising only if unpaid
rents had exceeded the property’s full value.91 Responding to petitions by frustrated
landlords, several provinces enacted regulations outlawing such arrangements, but
generally failed to enforce them.92
The closest analogy to permanent tenancy in early modern England was probably
the copyhold of inheritance. Established by manorial custom rather than the Common
Law, such tenancies usually had no fixed term, paid only a nominal rent, could be
inherited, sold, mortgaged or subleased just as freehold land, and were not subject to
direct evictions. Creation of copyholds, however, had progressively slowed during the
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, and had largely vanished by the Seventeenth.93 Quite
the opposite, landlords encumbered by copyholds were busy revoking copyhold rights,
usually by unilaterally raising rents or inheritance and conveyance fees.94 Copyholders
who converted their holdings into leasehold land under such pressure became tenants in
the modern sense: they held only for a fixed term of years, and could not pass the tenancy
to their heirs without the landlord’s express approval.
How, then, can we tally the stronger economic egalitarianism of Chinese property
norms, which came at significant inconvenience and cost to the wealthiest segments of
society, with the common perception of Chinese law and custom as fundamentally
hierarchical and unequal? Could a legal framework that embraced innate individual
inequality also promote cumulative economic equality? It depends, as alluded to in Part
One, on which concept of hierarchy we employ—class-based despotism or kinshipbased—and how we unpack their sociopolitical implications.
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If, in accordance with some variety of the traditional “oriental despotism” thesis,
Chinese institutional hierarchies simply enshrined the dominance of wealthy political
elites, then it is very strange why these elites would establish or tolerate property norms
that seriously damaged their own economic interests. Certainly they might occasionally
compromise with lower-income groups to foster goodwill and win prestige, in much the
same way that feudal European lords were expected to treat their subjects with some
benevolence, but that is hardly the case here. Instead, as discussed both above and below,
the spirited but futile attempts of central officials and local economic elites to reign in
“dian” redemption customs and eliminate permanent tenancy suggest not only elite
opposition to these norms, but also an inability to abolish them.
All this urges us to cast aside the understanding of Chinese sociolegal hierarchy
as “oriental despotism” or the dominance of wealthy elites: the state and the wealthiest
echelons of society simply were not that powerful. If the concept of “Chinese”
institutional hierarchy is to substantively survive, it must focus on the more complex
social hierarchies within kinship groups and families. When unpacked properly, not only
are kinship hierarchies consistent with the relative egalitarianism of Chinese property
norms, they actually explain it.
Part Three: Models and Theories
Among legal historians, the traditional explanation for the customary protection
of “dian” redemption rights in pre-industrial China has been exceedingly straightforward:
They derived directly from a moral and ideological embracement of “permanence in
landholding” ideals in “precommercial” societies.95 Some believe that interminable
redemption rights were a natural normative component of premodern economies: the
prevalence of subsistence agriculture was mutually reinforcing with mores that shamed
the loss of ancestral property and glorified the stable descent of land from generation to
generation.96 Others suggest that Chinese peasants simply possessed a strong sentimental
attachment to land and were unwilling to lose it97—this may have reflected, of course, the
higher socioeconomic value of land in pre-industrial societies.
The evidence presented in support of these arguments, however, is thin—
generally no more than vague moralizing by literati on the importance of land. The
higher economic value of land in preindustrial societies, on the other hand, pushed in
opposite directions: Apart from encouraging landowners to retain their properties, it also
encouraged them to aggressively acquire new property. The stubbornly high demand for
land sales, both permanent and “dian,” from around 1870 to the 1930s certainly suggests
that the latter dynamic was consistently at work in times of relative peace,98 despite the
prevalence of highly burdensome “dian” customs. The attractiveness of landownership
alone is, therefore, an inadequate explanation for the existence of those customs.
Consider also the comparison with England: Early modern English landowners, too, had
a strong sentimental and economic attachment to land, made all the more powerful by the
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dependency of sociopolitical status on landed wealth,99 but this clearly did not prevent
their customs from limiting redemption windows and tenancy security. If anything, the
strong psychological premium placed on landownership actually encouraged larger
landowners to champion such limitations.
Moreover, the characterization of early modern Chinese society as
“precommercial” has been severely challenged in recent scholarship: Studies of grain
price fluctuations within and across macroregions show that large portions of the rural
economy had become market-integrated. This directly contradicts older assumptions
about the dominance of subsistence agriculture. Evidence of market integration is robust
not only in core macro-regions such as the Lower Yangtze and North China, but also in
frontier regions such as Gansu.100 The Lower Yangtze, of course, boasted bustling
commodity markets that affected a significant majority of households. Perhaps 15
percent of the rural workforce was completely non-agricultural, and most agricultural
households also engaged in some textile or craft production.101
Unsurprisingly, commercialization went hand-in-hand with individual economic
rationality: most households were both calculating and resourceful. They invested in
land when profitable, employed excess labor in non-agricultural production, reacted
swiftly to fluctuations in land or commodity prices, and, as demonstrated below,
tirelessly promoted economic institutions and norms that favored their own interests.102
Certainly the existence of strong lineages promoted communal solidarity, but even within
lineages, households often clashed over property, debt, and the rules that governed
them.103 It is unclear how such a commercialized society could have sustained moral
ideals of “permanence in landholding.”
In fact, it probably did not. The evidence presented below strongly suggests that
such “ideals” were embraced only by those who could economically benefit from
them,104 and that “dian” and permanent tenancy customs were the result of intense and
prolonged negotiation between highly self-interested parties, rather than simple moral
derivatives of “precommercial” ideals. Bargained equilibriums could emerge where
moral uniformity did not. As a general theoretical matter, individuals may choose to
tolerate undesirable property norms for many reasons: to signal willingness for future
cooperation, for example, or fear of the material and reputational costs of noncompliance.
The assumption of basic self-interested rationality also applies easily to the
formation and maintenance of English property customs. Rural England was, as noted
above, a place of considerable ruthlessness and social tension when it came to property
acquisitions, evictions and enclosures. Market integration had also made tremendous
headways by the seventeenth century, as had urbanization and non-agricultural
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production. Correspondingly, the English population arguably became more
“industrious,” and devoted greater attention to wealth-management.105 The problem, then,
is why similarly self-interested bargaining over property norms in both China and
England led to dramatically different institutional outcomes.
This article argues that the explanation lies in how the two societies allocated
social status and rank. “Social status” conventionally refers to the rank of either an
individual or a group in a social hierarchy of honor or prestige.106 Such hierarchies
inevitably exist in human society, although they can be affected by a variety of factors—
physical prowess, wealth, religious or moral piety, age, and lineage, to name a few.
Although societies vary in the relative weight they give to each specific factor,107
generally, the reputational costs of contradicting a higher status person outweigh those of
contradicting a lower status one.108
This suggests a fairly straightforward model of norm negotiation: Individual
property owners negotiate for property norms based on their perceived self-interest, but
consider both material and reputational consequences when evaluating a particular norm.
Both kinds of consequences, but particularly the latter, are influenced by the social status
of allies and adversaries: all other things being equal, higher status adversaries can inflict
stronger reputational damages, whereas higher status allies can convey stronger
reputational rewards. Consequently, higher status individuals more often win favorable
institutional outcomes.
When applied to the historical questions examined here, these deductions suggest
the following: Because poorer households cumulatively possessed much higher social
status in China than in England, they were able to negotiate more favorable property
norms there. This incorporates large doses of self-interested rationality into the analysis:
if and when richer households conceded certain property norms to poorer ones, it was not
because they shared in some vaguely-defined “precommercial” ideal, but because the
social cost of a prolonged standoff was too high.
The higher cumulative status of poorer Chinese households derived, as suggested
above, from the “Confucian” emphasis on generational hierarchies109: The ranking of
lineage members by generational seniority—independently, in theory, of wealth—created
many high-status but low-income seniors. This vastly strengthened the collective
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bargaining power of poorer households vis-à-vis landlords and other land-accumulators,
helping them win substantial concessions over property norms.
In comparison, historians generally agree that, beyond a narrow class of nobility,
kinship ties were no longer of primary socioeconomic importance for most rural
Englishmen by the Sixteenth Century.110 More importantly, in the resulting
“individualist” social order, substantial personal wealth was almost always a prerequisite
for status and authority.111 Low-income households had very little representation among
the local political elite and, short of rejecting the social order itself, had limited
bargaining power in property norm negotiations. They might appeal, perhaps, to social
sympathy for the poor, but the strength of such sympathy was highly questionable in
either country—certainly incapable of preventing widespread social tension and conflict
over property norms. Consequently, English property customs gave comparatively little
protection to the economic interests of small landowners and tenants.
This thesis does not assume self-interested rationality on all levels of decisionmaking, but instead recognizes that normative internalization plays an important role in
distributing social status. As sociologists have long observed, norms that determine
status distribution are frequently “inconsistent” with materialistic rankings of human
ability, such as wealth, physical prowess, intelligence, education, or preexisting political
power.112 This suggests the influence of internalized norms, often of religious or moral
beliefs. Unlike tenancy or land transaction norms, people are commonly exposed to
kinship hierarchies—where they exist—from childhood, often in the form of ethical
exhortations, thus increasing the likelihood of widespread internalization.
Although this article takes kinship hierarchies as an independent variable, not as
something to be further explained, it may be prudent to quickly outline why it assumes,
as most historians have,113 that they were normatively internalized as a core moral
principle by the pre-Communist Chinese population. They had simply existed for so long,
and on such a massive scale, that it would be shocking if no significant internalization
had taken place. Kinship hierarchies were a staple of Chinese social life since at least the
wave of local lineage building around 1000 AD.114 By the Seventeenth Century, they
were an indisputable cornerstone of local social organization in “core” macroregions.115
Not coincidentally, local lineage building correlated with the rise of Song and Ming NeoConfucianism, which systematized the legal and social enforcement of kinship
hierarchies with unprecedented metaphysical rigor.116 Correspondingly, one finds, in
every era, an overwhelming amount of writing, including political documents,
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philosophical treatises, and lineage registries, that proclaimed embeddedness within
kinship hierarchies as “the natural way of heaven.”117
Moral internalization coexisted, of course, with a variety of functionalist factors:
With some exceptions, most Song, Ming and Qing governments promoted lineage
building as a cost-effective way to establish local order and decentralize the political
elite.118 Government sponsorship contributed, therefore, to the popularity of Confucian
kinship hierarchies, as did the many socioeconomic functions that kinship networks
performed, including dispute resolution, crime prevention, poor relief, and education.119
On the other hand, these functionalist factors cannot fully explain the consistent
popularity of kinship organizations throughout a millennium of radical political and
socioeconomic change: Government attitudes towards lineages were not always friendly,
particularly during the Ming and mid-Qing.120 Social organization and welfare functions,
on the other hand, were not the exclusive domain of kinship networks, but were also
provided by religious organizations.121 There was no necessary correlation between the
supply of these functions and the embracement of generational hierarchies.
In recognizing the importance of normative internalization in norm creation and
maintenance, the model constructed here bears some resemblance to the “precommercial
ideals” thesis. There are, however, enormous differences of degree. The model here
argues for striking the right balance between normative internalization and self-interested
negotiation. Property norms themselves, as demonstrated both above and below, were
economically sensitive and malleable. Operating in close proximity to people’s core
economic interests, particularly in early modern societies, they easily inspired
considerations of material self-interest and, therefore, tended to reflect equilibrium
outcomes of self-interested negotiation. On the other hand, self-interested negotiation
itself followed certain social rules of conduct, and could be affected particularly strongly
by norms that determine status and authority distribution. The problem, then, with the
“precommercial ideals” thesis is that it jumps too early into cultural internalization,
leaving no room for self-interested rationality.
Part Four: Empirics
This part provides empirical support for the model put forth in Part Three, broken
down into three sub-arguments: First, “dian” redemption customs were the source of
widespread social tension and negotiation. They were therefore far more likely the
equilibrium outcome of self-interested negotiation than the institutional manifestation of
“precommercial” morality. Second, the prevalence of kinship hierarchies allowed lowerincome households to regularly occupy positions of considerable sociopolitical authority
and dignity. Third, kinship hierarchies and corresponding status distribution patterns
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played a significant role in shaping the content and enforceability of “dian” redemption
norms. Section Four discusses comparable patterns and trends in English sociolegal
history.
Section One: Conflict and Negotiation
The clearest indication that “dian” redemption customs were never fully
internalized by Qing society is the sheer volume of litigation that they caused. This is
best illustrated by statistics drawn from available local case archives. Within North
China and the Lower Yangtze, there are two of these, one at Baodi County, Hebei
Province, the other at Longquan County, Zhejiang Province. Only the latter is well
preserved enough to project a reasonably solid statistical overview. It holds 18434 cases
from 1910 to 1949, including 10614 civil suits and 7820 criminal cases.122 Accounting
for the loss of case files over time, the average number of civil cases per year probably
ranged from 300 to 600—in a county of roughly 20,000 households—consistent with
preexisting estimates of late Qing and Republican county-level caseloads.123 Within the
10614 civil suits, 430 stemmed from a dispute concerning “dian” sales, of which 386
focused on whether the “dian” seller should be allowed to redeem.124 Assuming a
representative sample—there is no reason not to, this suggests that 4 to 5 percent of civil
disputes were “dian” related, with around 85 percent of those related directly to
redemption disputes. “Dian” redemption disputes were, therefore, one of the most
significant sources of civil litigation. Of course, it seems unlikely that more than a
fraction of contractual disputes ended up in court, which suggests that there may have
been a hundred or more of these disputes in the county each year.
A more difficult question is how many “dian” redemption cases involved claims
by the “dian” buyer that too much time had passed since the original contract for
redemption to be allowable. Because access to the full case archive remains limited, this
article relies on a randomly selected sample of sample of 80 “dian” cases, of which 65
were related specifically to “dian” redemption.125 26 of these featured express claims that
the “dian” seller’s redemption rights had expired after a certain period of time.126 This
was the single most common rationale relied upon by “dian” buyers to reject redemption
efforts.
Although precise projection is dangerous, these numbers do at least demonstrate
that “dian” redemption deadlines, or the lack thereof, were in fact a frequently contested
issue. Of the 26 “dian” expiration cases, 16 involved contracts that had been made more
than 30 years prior to the redemption attempt, the oldest of which was made 72 years
prior.127 In at least 5 of these 16, the “dian” buyer expressly cited a 1917 provincial
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regulation that banned redemption of “dian” contracts after 30 years.128 “Dian” sellers
avoided, naturally, any mention of this regulation. It should surprise no one that the
parties’ normative preferences dovetailed perfectly with their perceived economic
interests: “Dian” sellers preferred the customary norms of unlimited redemption, whereas
“dian” buyers petitioned the court to override those norms.
The local court’s response was, unsurprisingly, tepid and incoherent. In only one
of the 16 cases did it enforce the 30-year deadline against the “dian” seller.129 One other
redemption attempt was rejected because the seller repeatedly failed to show in court.130
In three other cases, the court allowed redemption despite the passage of 38, 50, and 59
years.131 The remaining 11 cases were settled. Such erratic adjudicatory behavior did
little damage to the reach and authority of local custom.
In addition, there is some qualitative evidence in these cases that “dian” buyers
were generally far wealthier than “dian” sellers. Several “dian” sellers described their
own economic circumstances as “poor,” “tight,” and “in shambles,” while referring to the
“dian” buyers as among “the wealthiest households” in the village.132 While this may
simply have been rhetoric flourish, the fact that the “dian” buyers in question never
contradicted these descriptions, despite their otherwise ruthless ad hominem attacks on
the “dian” sellers, lends them a fair dose of credibility.
The substantive composition of “dian” disputes brought before Qing county
courts elsewhere did not seem to differ significantly from the Republican-era patterns
observed in Longquan. In, for example, a sample of 26 “dian”-related cases randomly
drawn from the better-known Baodi, Baxian and Danxin archives—geographically
covering North China, the Sichuan basin, and Taiwan, whether redemption rights expired
after a certain number of years was the main point of contention in 9 cases, outnumbering
all other causes of dispute.133 The time span between initial transaction and attempted
redemption in these cases ranged from 11 years to 77, all beyond the 10-year deadline set
by the Board of Finance. All 9 cases were eventually resolved out-of-court, generally
under terms quite favorable to the “dian” seller.
A much larger spate of “dian” disputes can be found in three private case
collections from the Lower Yangtze, covering the years 1875-1908.134 Combined, they
yield 1063 local civil disputes, including 96 “dian”-related cases, 59 of which involved a
dispute over redemption.135 34 of the 59 focused specifically on whether redemption
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rights could expire.136 These ratios are similar to what we found in Baodi, Baxian,
Danxin, or Longquan, clearly indicating that “dian” redemption deadlines were a
significant source of social tension throughout the late Qing and Republic.
Widespread social tension over “dian” redemption deadlines also surfaces in a
variety of Republican-era social surveys. The most detailed of these are Japanese surveys
of rural North China conducted around 1940, otherwise known as the “Mantetsu
surveys.”137 Focusing primarily on six villages in Hebei and Shandong, they contain
several hundred interviews with villagers on local governance, customary law, and other
aspects of social organization. Naturally, general trends observed across the entire survey
are more reliable than specific information drawn from individual interviewees.
One particularly striking trend is the extent to which interviewees from different
economic backgrounds quarreled over property norms. In the two most extensively
surveyed villages, Sibeichai and Shajing, researchers asked over twenty villagers about
what they thought were the customs that governed “dian” transactions.138 In Sibeichai,
all interviewees agreed that “dian” redemption had no deadline,139 but at least one local
landlord complained that it was an “archaic” custom.140 On several other issues, the
landlords clashed openly with poorer village leaders over what the customs really were:
One former village chief of middling wealth argued that “dian” sales could be redeemed
even before the “guaranteed usage period” had expired, and even if the “dian” seller
owed additional debt to the “dian” buyer.141 Several others concurred.142 Landlords and
wealthier farmers disagreed: “Dian” buyers could deny redemption if the “dian” seller
owed any outstanding debt, or if the guaranteed usage period had yet to expire.143
In Shajing, social discord existed not only over these comparatively minor issues,
but also over whether “dian” redemption rights truly were interminable. Most
interviewees stated that local custom allowed redemption regardless of time passage
since the initial contract,144 but one person, unsurprisingly one of the largest landowners
in the village, declared that the true governing principle was the thirty-year redemption
deadline enacted by the 1929 Republican Civil Code.145 According to a poorer
interviewee, however, the rule was generally unenforceable in practice.146
Three other villages, Lengshuizhuang, Houxiazhai, and Wudian, resembled
Sibeichai more than Shajing, in that all interviewees affirmed the basic principle of
interminable redemption rights, but argued vigorously over more technical rules—for
example, whether guaranteed usage periods were enforceable.147 At Houjiaying,
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however, one interviewee declared that “although the traditional rule was that redemption
could take place at any time, now it must be done within thirty years.”148 This was a
once-wealthy store owner who possessed some real estate that his deceased brother had
“dian” purchased years ago from poorer neighbors, relying upon it to maintain a decent
standard-of-living.149 It is hardly surprising, then, that he both knew of the thirty-year
redemption law and attempted to take advantage. Other interviewees who were, in fact,
“dian” sellers disagreed in strong terms.150
The picture that emerges from this array of sources, both cases and interviews, is
one of tension and dispute over customary norms, but not of social chaos in which no
operative norm existed. Despite the large array of cases that involved the “dian” buyer
arguing that redemption rights expired after either ten or thirty years, an equally eyecatching trend is that, when the great majority of these cases were resolved out-of-court,
these same people almost always agreed to terms quite favorable to the “dian” seller, at
least in cases that report the settlement terms. Most often, after further negotiation
between senior relatives from both sides, they would simply allow the “dian” seller to
redeem.151 In the other cases, they retained possession of the land, but only after giving
the seller an additional payment, and often without receiving any promise that
redemption was henceforth prohibited.152 This casts into doubt the strength of their
resolve against these “archaic” customs. Their behavior is that of a practical “forum
shopper” who attempts to take advantage of the more accommodating property norms
provided by the central government, but retreats once the odds worsen and social pressure
intensifies. The resigned complaints of the frustrated Sibeichai landlord provide further
support for this interpretation.153 Even in Shajing and Houjiaying, the few interviewees
who proposed overriding traditional custom with legal regulations nonetheless
recognized that those customs did provide for unlimited “dian” redemption.154
There is, therefore, strong historical evidence that local communities regulated
“dian” transactions via customary law, but also that these customs were the source of
much social contention. In all likelihood, they were created via negotiation between selfinterested and, insofar as their preferred norms correlated to their perceived economic
self-interest, basically rational parties. Strikingly, the wealthiest segments of rural
communities frequently felt powerless against their poorer neighbors, and had to tolerate
property norms that substantially damaged their socioeconomic interests.
Section Two: Patterns of Status Distribution
This section measures the relative effects of kinship and wealth on status
distribution. It turns first to the Mantetsu surveys, which yield detailed demographic and
landholding data for all surveyed villages. The interviews identify 126 political elites
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across seven villages, current and former, who can be matched with landownership and
kinship information.155 These included village chiefs and their deputies, major lineage
chiefs, and “jiazhang” (“ten-household chiefs”) or equivalent. Not included in this
sample are people whose landholding information is unavailable.
Quite contrary to what previous—and far less statistically thorough—studies of
the Mantetsu surveys have suggested, lower-income households were proportionally
represented among the village political elite. 63 of the 128 owned less land than the
village median.156 Nor were all 63 concentrated in “lower-tier” positions—“jiazhang”
(head of a village subdivision) rather than village chief, for example. Of the 32 people
identified to have been village chief during the past decade, 14 owned less land per-capita
than the village average.157 Of the 35 largest landowners from the seven villages, only 9
had wielded any formal political authority in recent years.158 This was, of course, still a
considerably higher ratio than among lower-income households, but nonetheless low
enough to suggest that landed wealth was a weak determinant of sociopolitical authority.
On the other hand, the correlation between sociopolitical authority and
generational seniority was extremely strong. At least 108 of the 128 individuals belonged
to the most senior generation of what villagers identified as a “major kinship group.”159
Only 9 people clearly belonged to a younger generation, whereas the generational
standing of the other 11 are unclear.160 This suggests that well over 90 percent of village
political elites belonged to the senior generation of a major kinship group.
The above analysis assumes that political leadership positions were generally
objects of social desire, and therefore fairly accurate proxies for high status and authority.
But was this true? Based also on the Mantetsu surveys, Prasenjit Duara has argued that
the richest North China households actually avoided assuming direct political authority,
considering it burdensome and risky.161 The sole piece of evidence for these claims is an
interview with Du Fengshan, a Lengshuizhuang village chief who had served for over
two decades despite owning almost no land. Du notes that the village had undergone a
political reorganization after 1935, in which 14 lüzhang (a jiazhang equivalent) replaced
the 8 shoushi (“chief administrators”) who had previously handled basic administration.
He then lists from memory the names and landholdings of all 22 men.162 There was, as
Duara points out, no overlap between the two administrations. Moreover, Du reports
notably higher landholding figures for the 8 shoushi than for the 14 lüzhang. Duara
argues, therefore, that the village economic elite, as represented by the 8 shoushi, had
consciously withdrawn from political leadership positions.163
However, Du’s recollection is extraordinarily unreliable: no other interviewee
ever mentions the 8 shoushi he lists, and only one of them can be found on the village
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land registry.164 Moreover, that one person actually owned only 2 mu, not the 20 mu that
Du reported.165 Du’s list of the 14 lüzhang was likewise inaccurate. He misstates the
names of 4 people, and provides wildly inaccurate landholding numbers for another 5.166
Whether Du was consciously misleading the Japanese researchers is unclear—his
advanced age may have impaired his memory. Moreover, although there was no overlap
between the 14 lüzhang and the 8 shoushi that immediately preceded them, one lüzhang
had, in fact, been part of an earlier class of shoushi.167 The two classes of shoushi also
shared only one common member, suggesting that the large volume of personnel turnover
was traditionally normal. There is simply no reliable evidence that Lengshuizhuang
economic elites “withdrew” from village politics. Quite the opposite, some had
considerable political aspirations, even in 1940: According to one interviewee, the
village’s largest landowner could not obtain his desired sociopolitical status “because he
[was] only in his twenties.”168
The conclusions drawn here stand in distinct opposition to two previous studies of
the Mantetsu surveys: Duara’s, of course, but also Philip Huang’s important study of the
North China economy. Both suggest that, quoting Huang, “lineage leaders and village
‘councilmen’ were generally also the village rich.”169 They rely, however, on highly
incomplete surveys of village elite: Huang relies on a sample of 18 people;170 while
Duara provides only incomplete lists from Shajing, Houjiaying, and Lengshuizhuang.171
More comprehensive coverage demonstrates, however, that lower-income households
were hardly underrepresented among the political elite.
Certain regions of North China were, of course, more economically stratified than
others. Joseph Esherick and Kenneth Pomeranz have noted, for example, that resident
landlordism was more prevalent in the southwestern edge of Shandong Province than in
other regions of North China, with large landlords owning perhaps a third or more of all
arable land.172 Whether this meant that they dominated local social and political
authority, however, is ambiguous. The main sociopolitical function they controlled were
organizing and funding local militias—something only the rich could provide.173
Otherwise, there is no clear evidence that the ranks of local political elite were forcibly
monopolized by higher-income households. Southwestern Shandong villages were
highly consolidated, demographically stable, and resistant to government intervention,174
but this suggests cooperation between rich and poor as much as stratified dominance.
Social organization in the Lower Yangtze was different in several aspects, but
nonetheless similar in that it revolved around large kinship networks. Unlike North
China kinship groups, which owned almost no common property, a small but notable
fraction of arable land in the Lower Yangtze was owned not by individual households,
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but by lineages (“zongzu”)—commonly understood as kinship groups that collectively
owned some property, under arrangements quite similar to modern corporate holdings. 175
Compared to North China kinship groups, these lineages were better organized and more
populous.176 Whereas the average North China village might possess several kinship
groups, each consisting of a few dozen households, Lower Yangtze villages were very
often dominated by one large lineage, operating under published regulations and detailed
conduct codes. Political authority and status in geographical communities were therefore
inseparable from authority and status within lineages. But how did lineages allocate
status?
We focus here on the considerable number of lineage registries that were
produced throughout the Qing and early Republic. Apart from recording the family tree,
they also contained significant information on the use and maintenance of common
property, rules of personal conduct, and rules on the selection of lineage heads and
councilors. The collection of twelve registries analyzed here all hail from the Ningbo,
Shicang and Longquan regions of Zhejiang Province, each correlating to a large lineage
that dominated at least one village between 1870 and 1930.177
These lineages shared two basic organizational characteristics. First, none of the
registries positively identify personal wealth with higher internal status and authority. At
least three, in fact, expressly condemned as immoral the allocation of status based on
material affluence. The natural order of families was, they stated, one that gave senior
members precedence over junior ones, and any corruption of this principle by
materialistic concerns was intolerable.178 Second, of the seven lineages that published
selection criteria for leadership positions, all seven highlight the importance of
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generational seniority.179 The Jiang lineage of Ningbo, for example, divided its members
into five subgroups, each of which sent the eldest member of the highest generation to the
lineage council.180 This five-person council arbitrated all internal disputes, represented
the lineage in external negotiations, managed common property, coordinated labor and
resource sharing, and enforced lineage regulations. In this latter task, the council could
often count on the county government’s backing, to the point where “bringing offenders
to the county court” was listed as the punishment of last resort.181
Among members of the same generation, one lineage in our sample chose to rank
individuals not by age, but by lineal proximity to a descent line of firstborn males
extending back to the founding ancestor: his eldest son, the eldest son’s eldest son, and so
on.182 This line of eldest sons (“zongzi”) enjoyed higher status than other members of
their generation, regardless of age. All other members were ranked by their lineal
proximity to him: his brothers would, for example, have social precedence over his
cousins, usually through more prominent roles in ancestor worship rituals and easier
access to lineage leadership positions. In some lineages, although none in our sample,
the “zongzi” could succeed his father as lineage head even if some of the father’s
generation still lived, although in such cases he shared authority with councilors from the
higher generation.183 For the purposes of this article, these systems are not fundamentally
different from straightforward ranking by seniority, in that they rank lineage members
according to criteria that have little discernible correlation to wealth. Previous
scholarship on Lower Yangtze lineages suggest, in any case, that straightforward ranking
by generation and age gradually replaced “zongzi” systems during the Ming and Qing.184
Intelligence and possession of official degrees—extremely rare in the Qing185—were also
important considerations, but wealth per se did not obviously matter.186
Lower Yangtze lineages were, in this regard, noticeably different from lineages in
South China. In Fujian Province, scholars have identified three major structural
categories: “inheritance lineages,” which, like the Lower Yangtze lineages described
above, assigned leadership positions strictly based on generational seniority; “controlsubordination” lineages, where wealthier households expressly dominated poorer ones;
and “contractual lineages,” usually creations of convenience where various non-related
households banded together due to shared economic interests, and where leadership
selection was less organized.187 “Inheritance lineages” were still predominant in the late179
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Qing,188 but as corporate landholding expanded, the need for efficient management
occasionally concentrated authority into the hands of the most economically capable—
usually the wealthiest—households, creating a “control-subordination” lineage.189
The major difference between South China and the Lower Yangtze was, however,
precisely the amount of corporate land owned by lineages. Previous estimates of lineage
property show that, apart from South China, where it exceeded 35 percent of total arable
land, lineage landholding was trivial elsewhere.190 The economic rationales and
conditions that sometimes transformed “inheritance lineages” into less egalitarian forms
were therefore abundant in South China, but largely absent in the Lower Yangtze.
The existence of “control-subordination” and “contractual” lineages in South
China demonstrates that normative appeal of Confucian kinship ideals was not immune
from erosion by economic factors. It does not, however, imply that such ideals were in
widespread jeopardy. It would otherwise be difficult to explain the predominance, in
both North China and the Lower Yangtze, of kinship groups that adhered closely to them,
or even the smaller majority of “inheritance lineages” in South China.
Section Three: Kinship Hierarchies and Property Norms
The previous two sections have demonstrated that “dian” customs were the
product of self-interested negotiation, and that local status distribution correlated far
better with “Confucian” kinship hierarchies than with wealth distribution. It remains to
show to show that the relatively egalitarian distribution of status and rank facilitated by
these kinship hierarchies affected norm negotiation and enforcement in ways that favored
seller-friendly “dian” customs.
This is relatively straightforward for North China, where the Mantetsu surveys
provide numerous insights on the roles of village political elites in norm negotiation.
First and foremost, village leaders of middling or lower wealth were often quite
aggressive in protecting these customs against attempted erosion by landlords. The
clearest example of this is when Zhang Leqing, former village chief of Sibeichai and
middling landowner, engaged in a prolonged battle with local landlord Lin Fengxi over
the proper procedure for “dian” redemption.191 Zhang argued, internally and to county
investigators, that his redemption of a “dian” sale from Lin was only dependent upon
repayment of the initial “dian” price.192 He had later accrued additional debt to Lin, but
that was unrelated and immaterial. Lin countered that, because he had allowed Zhang to
remain on the “dian”-sold property as a rent-paying tenant, and because the additional
debt was actually several years of unpaid rent, it was too closely tied to the initial “dian”
transaction for Zhang to redeem without full repayment of all outstanding rent.193 This
was, to Lin, what local custom “should” have been.
Several local landlords voiced their support for Lin,194 but other lower-income
village elites sided with Zhang.195 By the time of the interview, the dispute was still
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ongoing, but Zhang was confident that his view would prevail.196 Lin, meanwhile,
seemed resigned that he would be unable to recuperate the outstanding rent before Zhang
redeemed, complaining that he could not fight the “stubborn” villagers who stuck to their
“backwards customs.”197
Although most disputes over “dian” customs in the surveyed villages were
relatively narrow and technical, similar to the Zhang Leqing-Lin Fengxi dispute, they
could sometimes trigger broader debates among village leaders about the expiration of
“dian” redemption rights. As discussed above, a few wealthy interviewees suggested
superseding traditional customs with national regulations that banned redemption after
thirty years.198 Naturally, lower-income interviewees rejected this out-of-hand.199
Many of these lower-income individuals were, in fact, members of the village
political elite. For example, Li Liangfu, a Lengshuizhuang village official of middling
wealth, seemed to know of the thirty-year legal deadline, but rejected outright any notion
that it should be enforceable in his village. Similar statements were made by Zhao
Shaoting, village councilor of Shajing, Hou Dingyi, former village chief of Houjiaying,
and Hou Ruihe, also a member of Houjiaying’s village administration.200 Zhang and Hou
Ruihe were both below-average landholders, whereas Hou Dingyi was slightly aboveaverage in terms of overall household landholding, but probably below average on a percapita basis due to the unusually large size of his household.201 In the three other
surveyed villages, the thirty-year redemption deadline was never openly discussed, but
researchers nonetheless encountered middling or low-income village leaders who
expressed preferences for “dian” customs that would allow “dian” sellers to, for example,
redeem even before the guaranteed-usage period had expired, or reject any right-of-firstpurchase claim made by “dian” buyers.202
Another notable observation is that the only two villages, Shajing and
Houjiaying,203 where some interviewees expressly argued—if unsuccessfully—that “dian”
redemption rights should expire beyond a certain deadline also happened to be the only
two villages where large landlords appeared to enjoy some noticeable political
advantage204: In Shajing, 5 of the top 8 village leaders (“huishou”), including the only
identifiable village chief, owned significantly more land per-capita than the village
average. In fact, 4 of them, including the village chief, owned more than twice as much.
In Houjiaying, 8 of 10 identifiable current and former village chiefs were above average
landholders, including 5 people who owned at least three times the average amount, 2 of
whom were among the village’s top 5 landholders. Additionally, 3 of 5 identifiable vice
village chiefs were above-average landholders. In no other surveyed village do aboveaverage landholders account for more than half of identifiable village chiefs, vice-village
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chiefs, or “huishou”/“baozhang”-level205 officials. Of course, even in Shajing and
Houjiaying, lower-income households still occupied most of the lower-ranked political
positions, but larger landholders did seem to enjoy a substantial edge in obtaining the top
positions. While this may be pure coincidence—that possibility is hard to rule out in a
sample of only seven villages—one reasonable interpretation is that the customary right
of unlimited “dian” redemption was more secure in villages where large landholders were
politically weaker.
All this suggests, ultimately, that vigorous support from lower-income political
elites was quite instrumental in sustaining and enforcing seller-friendly “dian” norms.
Their support could take effect in a variety of ways: As many interviewees attested,
village officials usually played crucial roles in mediating and settling “dian” and
permanent sale related disputes, and therefore had numerous opportunities in everyday
economic life to encourage and perhaps enforce adherence to their preferred institutional
norms.206 The Zhang Leqing-Lin Fengxi dispute also highlights the somewhat higherlevel forums, including formal litigation and village-wide “policy” debates, in which
advocacy and support by sympathetic political elites could be particularly effective at
reinforcing customary property institutions.
The Lower Yangtze poses greater empirical challenges. There are few sources
there, if any, that directly document the positions of village or lineage elites in “dian”related disputes—certainly nothing comparable to the Mantetsu surveys. Fortunately,
there is much circumstantial evidence to be found, from both the county case archives
discussed above and several major collections of land contracts from the same periods.
Whether in North China or the Lower Yangtze, few potential “dian” buyers and
sellers negotiated contracts themselves. Rather, one side would typically ask a
middleman to contact the other side, gather both sides’ preferences, propose a reasonable
compromise, measure the land, and, finally, draw up the deed. If any disputes flared up
after the contract signing, the middleman would likewise supervise initial mediation and
renegotiation attempts.207 Given these expansive duties, he needed to command enough
trust and respect within the community to effectively broker deals and settle disputes.
The argument here is that the great majority of Lower Yangtze middlemen were
relatively senior members of either the “dian” seller’s or the “dian” buyer’s kinship group.
These were usually identical, as most people preferred to do business with relatives. In
any case, the near-omnipresence of senior kinsmen in “dian” sales strongly suggests that
kinship groups were heavily involved with the negotiation and enforcement of proper
behavior in these transactions.
These claims rely on data culled from two recently discovered contract collections
in Zhejiang. The first is a set of 415 late-Qing land contracts from the Ningbo region, of
which 412 were “dian” sales contracts, redemption contracts, or conversions from “dian”
to permanent conveyance.208 All 415 identify not only the names of middlemen, but also
their kinship affinity, if any, with either contracting party—usually the seller. 403
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contracts employed at least one elder relative as middleman.209 Moreover, of the 389
transactions made between members of the same lineage, 385 employed only fellow
lineage members as middlemen.210 The most sought-after middlemen were generally
senior members of one’s lineage,211 brokering contracts for nephews or junior cousins.
There is no indication that personal wealth enhanced one’s perceived fitness to be
middleman—many, even the most popular, were themselves indebted “dian” sellers.212
The second contract collection is a batch of 140 land sales from Shicang Village,
Songyang County, spanning the years 1865 to 1915.213 108 of these, or 77 percent, were
“dian” transactions. The social composition of middlemen in these contracts was almost
identical to the Ningbo collection: 130 of the 140 land sales, and 103 of 108 “dian”
transactions, involved at least one middleman who was an elder relative of one
contracting party, and the great majority involved at least three.214 Here, too, certain
senior members of the locally dominant lineage were in high demand.215
These empirical patterns highlight the influence that senior lineage members
exerted on land transactions and their underlying social norms. Most importantly,
middlemen were also mediators and arbitrators of first-resort in case of dispute, and
therefore exercised considerable authority over the contracting parties. Employing senior
relatives as middlemen further strengthened such authority and gave them a legitimate
opportunity to advocate and enforce their understanding of local property norms. From
there, it is but a small step to suggest that, because these senior relatives were often
themselves low-income “dian” sellers, their wide-ranging influence over transactions
weakened the ability of higher-income households to obtain their preferred normative and
contractual outcomes.
One would also expect that this weakening effect was particularly strong in intralineage “dian” sales, as the influence of middlemen should have been significantly
stronger when they were related to both parties. On the other hand, middlemen who were
unrelated to either side possessed comparatively less authority, as the reputational costs
of ignoring or contradicting them were significantly lower. This increased the potential
for extended conflict and ruthless bargaining tactics in inter-lineage transactions. For
example, inter-lineage sales accounted for a strong majority of “dian” disputes in the
Lower Yangtze county cases discussed in Section One,216 even though they probably
accounted for only a small fraction of all “dian” sales.217 Therefore, if kinship hierarchies
affected the negotiation and enforcement of “dian” customs in favor of lower-income
households, their effect should have been greater in cases where buyer and seller
belonged to the same lineage.
This is precisely what we find in these county-level cases.218 In one 1896 case
from Zhuji County, a relatively junior member of the local Zhou lineage attempted to ban
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a cousin-in-law from redeeming land her husband had conveyed to him five years ago.219
The point of contention was whether the conveyance was a “dian” sale—here termed a
“ya” transaction—or a permanent one. After consulting with other community members,
the magistrate decided that the debate was immaterial: “[A]t the time of the transaction,
the parties clearly should have understood that, because they were relatives, not only was
a “dian” sale certainly redeemable, but there was also no reason why a permanent sale
would not be. . . . In any case, [the defendant] is [the plaintiff’s] senior cousin-in-law . . .,
so why does he not treat her according to reason and moral responsibility?”220 This was
no isolated incident: similar decisions appear in at least three other cases.221
The magistrate cites no clear authority for this extraordinary claim, but unless we
assume incredible ignorance of central laws and regulations, he was probably aware that
it violated every formal legal authority possible.222 Moreover, it seems implausible that
he believed that this was some universal moral commandment—the steps he took to
reach the conclusion, including meeting with community members, indicate that he was
persuaded of its applicability under certain circumstances, not that he came in with apriori moral faith in it. This strongly suggests that the claim derived from his
understanding of local customary practices.
He was not alone in this observation. It also appears in three cases decided by
another Lower Yangtze magistrate from the same era, who commented that, because
“dian” buyers were expected to show greater leniency for low-income kinsmen,
permanent sales between kinsmen were redeemable.223 The vast majority of “dian”
sellers would probably have appreciated this extra concession, especially if, as argued
above, the selling of property was usually a last resort in times of extraordinary financial
need. All this suggests, as argued above, that middlemen were often sympathetic towards
the economic interests of lower-income relatives, and could act upon that sympathy more
strongly in cases where the transacting parties were kinsmen.
Section Four: English Comparisons
Ultimately, there is much evidence, from both North China and the Lower
Yangtze, that the relatively egalitarian status-distribution patterns within kinship
hierarchies affected norm negotiation and enforcement in ways that promoted sellerfriendly “dian” customs. But does the prevalence of kinship hierarchies in China—and
the lack thereof in England—also explain the institutional divergence between Chinese
and English property customs? This article argues, of course, that they do. This again
relies on three sub-arguments: First, English property norms, like Chinese ones, were
largely the product of self-interested maneuvering and negotiation. Their comparatively
weaker protection of lower-income households reflected, therefore, the weaker
bargaining position of those households. Second, substantial landed wealth was
generally a prerequisite for high social status and political leadership in rural England,
allowing large landowners to monopolize positions of power. Third, kinship networks
were far less expansive and influential in England than in China and, consequently, were
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of marginal significance in status distribution and norm negotiation. Ultimately, the
reach and influence of “Confucian” kinship hierarchies in China was indeed a distinct
factor that substantially explains the Sino-English divergence in property regulation.
Preexisting scholarship provides largely consensual support for all three subarguments. As discussed above, studies of early modern English land norms have
highlighted the aggressive, even ruthless, manner in which large landlords attempted to
reshape property norms in their favor.224 Especially in the 16th and 17th Centuries, the
wide array of unilateral enclosures, evictions, rent and fee manipulation, and default
seizures that wealthy households employed to accumulate and consolidate land clashed
intensely with what lower-income households considered normatively appropriate.225
Even after 1700, when enclosures had become less controversial, issues such as gleaning
rights remained highly contentious between higher and lower income households.226
Scholars therefore regularly portray the process of norm creation as one negotiated by
highly self-interested parties, often with a shade of class-conflict.227
The striking thing about English property norms is not merely that they treated
lower-income households less leniently than Chinese norms, but also that they became
progressively less lenient over time: The normative position of small tenants, for example,
deteriorated quite severely during the 16th and 17th Centuries as large landowners hacked
away at traditional customs that protected copyholders and leaseholders.228
Mortgage laws and customs underwent a similar transformation. During the 12th
and 13th Centuries, it was still possible to establish “living gages” (vivum vadium)—an
archaic predecessor to mortgages—in which the debtor did not face any fixed deadline to
redeem.229 Rather, the creditor would assume possession of the collateralized land, and
whatever produce it generated would count towards the initial debt, along with any
repayment the debtor might make. By the 15th Century, this relatively debtor-friendly
instrument had fallen into disuse, replaced almost completely by “mortgages” that
required repayment within a fixed term.230 On the bright side, many local customs still
guaranteed the defaulting debtor a foreclosure sale, so that he might at least recoup the
full market value of the collateral.231 The deterioration of the debtor’s institutional
position accelerated, however, during the 16th and 17th Century: First, an increasing
number of local customs cut down on repayment windows, to the point where mortgage
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contracts generally demanded redemption within a year of the original transaction.232
Second, the foreclosure sale was gradually replaced, both normatively and in practice, by
automatic full conveyance to the creditor upon default, even if the initial mortgage sum
fell far short of the land’s full value.233 Clearly, property norms leaned increasingly
towards wealthy, land-accumulating, households.
This brings us to point two. Even during the 16th Century, when wealth disparity
was not nearly as severe as in the 18th Century, large English landowners enjoyed one
distinct advantage over their Chinese peers: they possessed a near-monopoly on formal
sociopolitical authority within local communities. Surveys of English localities during
the 16th and 17th Centuries have repeatedly shown that recognition as a “gentleman” and
the assumption of political responsibility were almost universally dependent upon the
possession of substantial landed wealth.234 Scholars have traditionally argued, in fact,
that higher levels of landownership directly “dictated” higher social and political
status.235 More recent studies have tempered this argument, demonstrating that other
factors, including a consistent commitment to public service or long-term residency in the
community, were comparably important.236 On the other hand, they continue to
emphasize that significant landed wealth was at least a prerequisite for high status and,
moreover, that other factors displayed considerable correlation with wealth: Because
larger landowners generally had more settled residency patterns and stronger records of
public service, the effects of these various factors were often conflated.237 In any case, a
sociopolitical situation like that in Sibeichai, where most village leaders were actually
below-average landholders, would have been unthinkable.
Why larger English landowners enjoyed this monopoly has no simple explanation.
To some extent, it was buttressed by sociopolitical reorganization after the Black Death,
in which the “the upper orders of English society drew together into a more cohesive
government” to combat the social disorder created by the death of perhaps half the
country’s population.238 The large expansion in state power weakened, on the one hand,
hereditary hierarchies between lords and subjects, but, on the other, because the state
delegated local authority exclusively to the landed classes, it also excluded lower-income
households more completely from positions of power. On the other hand, significant
wealth-based stratification certainly predated the Black Death.239 Moreover, the
monopolization of political authority by the landed classes was generally discussed in
highly didactic terms—for example, the nobility and gentry were referred to by
influential clergyman William Harrison as “those whome their race and blood or at least
their vertues doo make noble and knowne”—that suggested at least some moral
internalization.240 Most likely, moral internalization and state promotion went hand in
hand. In any case, the status dominance of higher-income classes predated widespread
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landlord encroachment upon traditional customary property rights by over a century, and
was almost certainly an important precondition.
There remains, for the sake of logical completeness, the issue of whether kinship
networks influenced status distribution in England. In short: not significantly. While
Alan Macfarlane’s controversial work on “English individualism” is probably the first
item that comes to mind on this,241 later scholarship confirms his basic findings with
better evidence and more systematic analysis: that individual landowners were generally
free to buy, sell or mortgage land without substantial interference from their kinship
groups or traditional feudal hierarchies of landownership.242 Many, perhaps most,
landowners preferred to keep their property within the family if possible, but “no one
would deny that . . . they had the right to buy and sell land without reference to their
kin.”243 For most non-nobility, the “vital social bonds” in their lives were “not with an
extended kinship group,”244 but rather with fellow community members. Theirs was a
highly mobile society in which most personal relationships were cultivated upon mutual
interest, rather than inherited, and, correspondingly, where wealth was the most, perhaps
only, reliable indicator of sociopolitical status.
Part Five: Conclusion
The relative egalitarianism of Chinese property institutions is paradoxically
explained by the prevalence and influence of kinship hierarchies in rural communities.
This fundamentally revises the common perception that Chinese legal culture was one of
caste-like inequality, socioeconomic stratification, and elite dominance. Quite the
contrary, especially when compared to corresponding institutions in early modern
England, Chinese kinship and property norms encouraged macro-level status equality
between economic classes and, consequently, afforded stronger protection to lower
income households. Although English law and custom had done away with most feudal
indentures by the 17th Century, law and custom continued to embrace wealth-based
inequality in both status distribution and substantive property law. In comparison, by
overriding wealth-based status inequality with “Confucian” kinship hierarchies, Chinese
social norms actually promoted substantive socioeconomic equality.
Although this thesis focuses on social norms and customary law, the state has
hardly been invisible. State support was clearly an important reason why kinship
hierarchies were so embedded in Chinese society.245 Likewise, the consolidation of
sociopolitical power in the English landed classes benefitted from state expansion after
the Black Death. If legal authorities often took a back seat to social norms in direct
regulation of land transaction, they were certainly center-stage in shaping the status
distribution norms that underlay those norms. Quite ironically for Qing and Republican
governments, property customs created under the influence of state-sponsored kinship
norms often contradicted, indeed overrode, official property regulations. Many would
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argue that the early modern English state behaved more consistently: both its status
redistribution efforts and its forays into substantive property regulation—tenancy,
mortgages, and so on—usually favored higher-income households.246 This contrast was
not, however, due to any difference in the economic composition of officials: wealthy
families dominated government ranks in both countries. More likely, it stemmed from
differences in sociolegal culture, in what were internally understood to be the proper
norms of status distribution.
The theoretical implications of this thesis are expansive. It urges, first of all, a
reassessment of “Confucianism” and “Confucian” social hierarchies. Since at least the
early 20th Century, Chinese intellectuals have viciously attacked what they perceived as
“feudal” (“fengjian”) norms of “Confucian” hierarchy, which purportedly led to moral
bankruptcy and the ruthless oppression of lower-income classes by a combination of
large landowners, merchants, literati gentry, and perpetually corrupt government
officials.247 Despite—or perhaps because of—the deep politicization of these ideas, they
remain tremendously influential in the Chinese academic world even today, enjoying
deep support among both self-identified Marxists and liberals.248 At the same time, they
also continue to have surprising traction with Western intellectuals, many of whom have
yet to advance substantively beyond the Weber and Wittfogel stereotypes of
“Confucianism” as either fundamentally “irrational” or “despotic.”249
The conclusions presented here suggest that this stereotype is deeply flawed:
Especially when compared to corresponding English norms, kinship hierarchies in both
North China and the Lower Yangtze promoted, not suppressed, the cumulative
sociopolitical status of lower-income households, facilitating the creation of property
institutions that protected their economic interests against those of wealthier households.
In fact, the closer real-life kinship organization resembled the Confucian ideal of strict
ordering by generational seniority, the stronger its egalitarian socioeconomic effects: the
comparison between Lower Yangtze and South China lineages is particularly
illuminating. Interestingly, this does not necessarily exonerate kinship hierarchies from
accusations of damaging economic growth. As I have argued elsewhere, the
egalitarianism of “dian” and tenancy customs unfortunately deepened the relative
underdevelopment of Chinese capitalism—whereas the harshness of English land
customs towards smallholders and tenants was actually a long-term economic asset.250
Be as that may, if the primary economic problem with Confucian kinship hierarchies was
that they were inefficiently benign towards the poor, then that already differs deeply from
the conventional stereotype.
Along the way, this article has presented a substantially more ambitious—both
theoretically and empirically—account of how property norms were shaped and reshaped
in early modern China than is available in previous scholarship. It demonstrates how
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rationalistic self-interest and internalized kinship norms operated on different levels, and
at different stages, of the norm-making process, indeed across different geographical
regions and in an era of intense political turmoil and rapid economic change. More
abstractly, it illustrates how internalized norms of status distribution influence, even
predetermine, the rational and self-interested negotiation of property norms. The
comparison with early modern England further diversifies the geographical and temporal
applicability of this basic model.
The apparent ability to explain property institutions across highly diverse cultural
and economic terrain hints, however tentatively, at the model’s broader theoretical
significance: While this article only demonstrates that sociological internalization and
economic rationality can coexist and interact in social norm creation—in fact quite
consistently with the hitherto empirically unproven “pyramid of norms” thesis251—a
bigger question is how often they do so. Are most, perhaps even all, property norms the
product of such interaction? Should we therefore explore “cultural paradigms” that
explain divergent property norms in different societies, both historical and contemporary,
even if we acknowledge that the immediate individual reaction to property institutions is
one of economic self-interest? Ultimately, how much should we “culturalize” the law
and economic analysis of property?252 At the very least, this article shows that, for those
willing to work across academic disciplines and geographic boundaries, the analytical
tools and empirical material to address these questions are readily available.
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